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Abstract 
Globalization of food sourcing and increased sustainability awareness among consumer has triggered the 
emergence of a plethora of voluntarily adopted quality standards addressing issues related to food safety, 
environmental protection, and socio-economic conditions. This paper assesses the relative qualities of these 
standards. Are some standards better than others? The study examines 30 standards that are relevant to global 
agri-food retail chains, in terms of their sustainability scope and compliance likelihood. It is found that, on 
average, the likelihood of compliance remains rather low. Standards initiated by NGOs or non-profit 
organisations have the highest compliance likelihood, followed by standards initiated by business associations 
and individual firms. The position in the global value chain of standard initiators proofs an important predictor of 
the standard’s qualities. Other than expected, lower scores are found with standards initiated by partnerships. 
This might an indication of their relatively recent inauguration. Product-specific standards have higher 
compliance likelihood than generic standards.  
 
Keywords: global value chain governance, sustainability, benchmarking, compliance likelihood, quality 
standards    
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1. Introduction 
There is a growing interest in the development of common strategies to improve the 
sustainability of production and trade of (tropical) food sourced in developing countries. 
Requiring suppliers to comply with specific quality standards – often accompanied by 
labelling and/or trade-marks – is often presented as an appropriate strategy to reach the 
desired goal.  What remains unclear, however, is to what extent and on what grounds these 
standards can be considered sustainable. This paper presents findings of a study that aims to 
define what standards say they do and whether they do what they say. 
 
In the 1990s the international trade in high-value agri-food products expanded significantly. 
Fresh and processed fruits and vegetables, fish, meat, nuts and spices, as a whole, now 
account for more than 50 per cent of developing country agricultural and food exports 
(Henson and Jaffee, 2006). Simultaneously, broader demographic and social trends have 
changed the nature of food markets in industrialised countries and altered expectations and 
demands (Buzby, 2003; Caswell, 2003; Henson and Jaffee, 2006). Consumers in 
industrialised countries have well-established and persistent concerns about certain 
dimensions of safety and quality attributes of food, especially with regard to environmental, 
social and food safety issues.  
 
As a response to these concerns, governments and large food retailers, food manufacturers, 
and food service operators have developed and enhanced forms of sustainability controls, 
resulting in a complex and dynamic landscape of quality standards, trade marks and labels 
that continues to evolve (Busch, 2003; Ponte and Gibbon, 2005; Fold and Pritchard, 2005; 
Van Tulder with Van der Zwart, 2006). These public and private standards govern 
contemporary global agri-food systems and have become a priori mandatory, especially in 
high-value supply chains (Henson and Reardon, 2005). This has ambiguous effects on 
developing country suppliers: quality standards may either serve as a barrier or a catalyst to 
development (Henson and Jaffee, 2006; Danse and Vellema, 2007). 
 
The public and private modes of supply chain governance have distinct institutional forms, 
but influence one another in terms of both content and procedures (Busch and Bain, 2004; 
Ponte and Gibbon, 2005; Ingenbleek and Meulenberg, 2006). It is therefore increasingly 
difficult to separate their distinct influence on firm conduct and supply chain sustainability 
performance, including the effects on suppliers. The web of partly overlapping quality 
standards puts both leading firms in the chain and NGOs in a dilemma when they have to 
choose or promote specific standards. These considerations led to the present study involving 
a comparison of quality standards relevant to European retail firms that source also in 
developing countries.  
 
This paper examines the effectiveness of quality standards. It follows a particular approach in 
that it involves an examination of objectives of-, and likelihood of compliance with quality 
standards, rather than an assessment of effects achieved. The central question addressed in 
this paper is twofold:  
1. How to measure the qualities of voluntary quality standards in terms of (a) their 
contribution to sustainability of global, agri-food supply chains, and (b) the likelihood of 
compliance? 
2. What is the relative performance of the main voluntary quality standards in the retail, and 
which variables are influencing the qualities and performance of these standards?  
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The paper is organized as follows. First we discuss the governance of sustainability issues 
based on supply chain and business development theories (section 2), which leads to a 
number of propositions (section 3). In section four we explain the measurement instrument 
that was developed for examining voluntary quality standards. Section five presents the 
findings of the study involving 30 quality standards common to the European retail sector. 
Section 6 concludes and considers some managerial and policy consequences.  
 
 
2. Governing sustainability within global retail chains 
 
Quality standards are agreed criteria. They are “external points of reference by which a 
product or a service’s performance, its technical and physical characteristics, and/or process 
and conditions under which it has been produced or delivered, can be assessed” (Nadvi and 
Wältring, 2004: 56). Standards consist of “rules of measurement” and a “system of 
classifications based on quantifiable attributes”) (Jones and Hill, 1994). Quality standards 
may be mandatory, or voluntarily adopted. Mandatory standards are imposed by governments 
and intended to protect business or consumers within national jurisdictions from dishonest 
practices and risks. Voluntarily adopted, private quality standards intend to enhance inter-firm 
compatibility and may improve competitiveness of individual firms. Private standards serve 
the function of reducing transaction costs for buyers in the chain, particularly in situations 
where buyers have no ownership relation with suppliers, and/or when suppliers are located in 
countries with less stringent mandatory regulations. The ever more complex production 
relations resulting from global sourcing and increasing product differentiation make the use of 
quality standards inevitable to facilitate tight coordination and harmonization of norms and 
codification (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004: 353; Navdi and Wältring, 2004: 53-56). 
However, technical efficiency and transaction cost reduction are not the only reasons for 
companies to voluntarily adopt quality standards, and this can best be explained in the context 
of the Global Value Chain (GVC) approach.  
 
Like mainstream supply chain theories, GVC analysis uses the chain as metaphor for studying 
relationships between aligned firms. Its value added is the analytical model that (a) includes 
dependency relationships between small, local firms and multinational corporations that are 
linked together in global markets, (b) considers the influence exerted by non-market actors, 
such as governments and NGOs on the intra-chain relations, and (c) facilitates the analysis of 
normative issues related to production processes and the distribution of chain gains (see e.g. 
Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994; Gibbon and Ponte, 2005; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004). 
 
Central in GVC analysis is the organizational or governance dimension, which refers to forms 
of intra-chain coordination. In most global value chains a ‘lead’ or ‘core’ company can be 
identified on the basis of its market power and value-added generation. The core company is 
increasingly strengthening its position as chain leader or chain director by setting the 
standards for quality of production for the entire chain. Quality management has in fact 
become one of the key aspects of chain governance (Fulponi, 2007; Gibbon and Ponte, 2005; 
Muradian and Pelupessy, 2005). It is a source of power over other companies in the chain 
which is not related to the degree of ownership, but rather to the ability of managing the sales 
of the chain’s product. Designing quality and performance criteria is a form of hands-off 
coordination, for which the costs are often transferred to suppliers. Hence, the voluntary 
character of a private standard is limited to the core firm who deliberately chooses for its 
adoption. From the perspective of primary suppliers in the value chain, private quality 
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standards are de facto mandatory; they run the risk of losing business if they fail to comply 
with them.   
 
In global food chains, the retail sector has assumed core positions with the prospect that, in 
2010, only ten (food) retail firms are expected to dominate the supermarket sector worldwide 
(Fox and Vorley, 2004). The food chains also have become more international/global due to 
the expansion of imported food items. For example, 6 per cent of Wal-Mart’s total 
merchandise was imported in 1995, against 60 per cent in 2004. Companies like Wal-Mart 
have become gate keepers to the main global markets.2 The flip site is that, as the core firms 
in global chains, retail companies are being held accountable and responsible for the product 
qualities and the conditions under which they were produced wherever in the chain. To avoid 
the risk of reputation damage and extended liability, retail firms govern their supply chains 
intensively by means of a wide range of voluntarily adopted quality standards. These 
standards are intended to make supply chains more sustainable, which means that they 
consider the interests of people, planet and profit (Elkington, 1998; Serageldin, 1996; 
Serageldin and Steer, 1994). Most of the voluntary quality standards in the retail sector focus 
on socio-economic conditions of production, environmental protection or food safety. 
However, little is known about the extent to which these standards cover the sustainability 
categories and whether or not the requirements are met.  
 
Key in the assessment of the qualities of quality standards is their compliance, that can be 
defines as “rule-consistent behaviour of those actors, to whom a rule is formally addressed 
and whose behaviour is targeted by the rule” (Börzel, 2000). Since it is almost unfeasible to 
verify compliance for all product parts at all stages in the value chain for a large number of 
quality standards, the effectiveness of quality standards could also be assessed by an 
examination of the likelihood of compliance as a proxy of real compliance. 
 
‘Compliance likelihood’ is the probability that companies will conform in practice to their 
private codes or quality standards, and that the claims will in fact be translated into 
responsible behaviour and action (Kolk and van Tulder, 2005). The compliance likelihood is 
determined by the compliance mechanisms included in codes or quality standards and the 
extent to which the claims put forward are measurable. The more specific the codes or quality 
standards are, the better can they be measured and, subsequently, monitored. Monitoring is 
expected to enhance the standards’ comprehensiveness and compliance likelihood. 
 
One of the variables that are likely influencing compliance likelihood of voluntary quality 
standards is the standard initiator. A few publications have introduced typologies of 
standards based on the designers: ‘standard initiators’ (Muradian and Pelupessy, 2005), and 
standard ‘key drivers’ (Nadvi and Wältring, 2004). Both classifications serve as empirical 
categories. They group standards but they are not based on conceptual models intended to 
explain relationships with the standards’ qualities. International standard initiators can be 
fivefold: (1) individual firms, (2) consortia of firms or branche organizations (so called 
Business-Support Groups, BSGs), (3) non-governmental or non-profit oriented organizations, 
(4) international governments, and (5) partnerships between firms, NGOs and governments.  
The concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) approaches3 (van Tulder with van der 
                                                 
2
 “Is Wal-Mart good for America?” Interview with G, Gereffi. Frontline, November 16, 2004, 
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/walmart/interviews/gereffi.html 
3
 CSR is the principle that companies are responsible for solving problems they have caused, and for helping to 
solve problems that are indirectly connected to their core functions (see e.g. Wartick and Wood 1998: 76).   
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Zwart, 2006; van Tulder et al, in press) employs a similar typology but is more promising in 
terms of proposition development. Four types of core firm CSR strategies can be 
distinguished in value chains, determined by two dimensions: firm responsiveness and the 
firm’s moral attitude. An ‘inactive’ CSR approach is characterized by an inside-out  
(shareholder) orientation and a corporate focus on liability rather than moral responsibility. 
The opposing CSR approach is called ‘pro-active’, which has an interactive (stakeholder) 
orientation and is focused on both liability and moral responsibility, while engaging other 
stakeholders in the process of standard development. A ‘re-active’ CSR strategy is an outside-
in perspective and goes beyond liability towards responsibility, primarily because of potential 
reputational damage. A re-active CSR approach often goes together with relatively lax 
compliance rules. An ‘active’ CSR strategy first considers the moral responsibilities of firms 
and tries to engage other stakeholders in adopting its own standards. The standard might be 
relatively vague, but its compliance rules are often rather stringent (responsibility and liability 
are the same).  
 
 
3. Propositions 
 
There are four dimensions of the standardization process that can be taken into consideration 
when assessing the quality of the standards: (1) who initiated the standard and their position 
in the GVC; (2) whether this is done by an individual actor or a group of actors and what the 
impact of timing on the standard is; (3) the focus of the standard in general and (4) the issues 
in specific that are addressed by the standard. For each of these dimensions we have 
developed propositions.   
 
First, as regards, the initiator of the standard, the approach taken can be expected to be 
derived from the relative position inside or outside the global value chain. Standards initiated 
by individual NGOs  can be expected to show the highest possible compliance likelihood, 
compared to standards designed by firms themselves. NGOs in general will opt for greater 
transparency of the whole value chain, since they derive their bargaining position and 
legitimacy directly from citizens and consumers. In the literature on codes of conduct (cf. 
Kolk and Van Tulder, 2005) NGO codes have previously been found to have the highest 
compliance likelihood.  NGOs, however, operate more or less outside of the GVC, which 
makes it easier to adopt an active CSR approach and operationalise standards with a higher 
compliance likelihood. Intergovernmental organizations, also derive their legitimacy from 
citizens – which would make their orientation comparable to that of NGOs -  but in a more 
indirect manner, i.e. through their governments. This makes the compliance likelihood of their 
standards lower than for individual NGOs. 
 
Individual food producers operate of course inside the value chain. They are generally 
positioned downstream of the retailers and upstream from the suppliers of resources. So, they 
have a mixed position in the GVC which also could lead to a more ambiguous attitude 
towards standards. They are on the one hand interested in managing their own value chain, 
which is enhanced by keeping much of the chain information proprietary. On the other hand, 
they are in direct contact with the retailers that ask for the biggest possible transparency. So 
their position in the value chain will probably lead to considerably lower compliance 
likelihood than NGO standards. However, as compared to (international) governments, it is 
not really clear what can be expected. The pressure on firms to (at least) adopt some of the 
minimum standards that are introduced by intergovernmental agencies is high, so it is unlikely 
that major firms – even if they adopt only a reactive approach - will go below the international 
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standard. Leading companies that for instance adopt quality standards from NGOs do so in 
the context of an active or pro-active CSR strategy. Their participation in the design likely 
also results in a standard that is more apt to the firm’s organization and long-term strategy. 
Furthermore, since these standards have been co-designed by non-private stakeholders that 
are not primarily focused on the business case, they presumably entail more opportunities for 
sustainable supply chains than do business-developed standards.. .  
 
Proposition 1: Quality standards designed by individual NGOs, have higher compliance 
likelihood than have standards designed by individual firms. Quality standards pioneered by 
individual firms will have at least the same compliance likelihood as international government 
standards. 
 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, the standard formulation and implementation process 
by individual actors has become complemented by more partnership oriented processes (Van 
Tulder, v.d. Zwart, 2006).  Partnerships with stakeholders are a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition for a pro-active approach. Partnerships have generally been struck within the sector 
(through industry associations), between NGOs and firms and by intergovernmental 
organisations, often in the form of multi-stakeholder dialogue processes. The partnership 
process can include consultation or joint standard setting. The latter requires much more 
commitment of the participating actors than the former. Consultation are often part of a more 
re-active approach to standards. Standards struck within the same group, such as industry 
associations, have been found to go for the ‘lowest common denominator’ as regards 
standards and codes (ibid). The reason for this being that in industry associations, the least 
interested party dominates the standard setting process. This process has also been referred to 
as ‘adverse selection’ (Lennox and Nash, 2003). Standards initiated by business sector groups 
can in general be expected to particularly reflect corporate concerns for liability prevention 
and reputation damage. BSG standard will show relative low compliance likelihood.  
Partnerships with outside parties (bilateral or tripartite partnerships; see Kolk et al., 2008) that 
lead to standards have the potential to be easier accepted than standards independently 
proposed by these ‘outside’ parties. They could evade adverse selection effects or the lowest 
common denominator mechanisms that BSGs suffer from. Many of the intergovernmental 
organisations have actively engaged in stakeholder consultation with firms and NGOs. The 
coordination of this consultation, has been in the hands of the intergovernmental organization.  
Joint standard setting – rather than consultation - requires that firms take the initiative for the 
partnership or actively engage in the formulation of the standard by the outside party. The 
active involvement of firms can make the standard more specific, and thus increase their 
compliance likelihood. Most of the actual partnerships, however, are yet in their infancy and 
therefore suffer from considerable start-up problems. Bi/trilateral partnerships initially will 
suffer from comparable problems as BSGs (such as adverse selection and lowest common 
denominator). The compliance likelihood of the standard coming from partnerships depends 
on the strategic intentions of in particular the firms that participate in the partnerships and 
their position in the value chain. The more parties are represented and the more diverse their 
interests are, the slower the partnership will lead to specific and high quality standards.   
 
 
Proposition 2: Quality standards designed by (bi/trilateral) partnerships have potentially a 
higher compliance likelihood than standards designed by individual NGOs, firms or inter-
governmental organizations. Partnership standards that have experienced a longer gestation 
period, or that represent very diverse interests might still show relatively low compliance 
likelihood. 
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A third dimension of quality standards is their focus. Quality standards may either be focused 
on a specific product category or have a generic focus. The criteria of product-specific 
standards are focused on a specific product and are likely more detailed and technical in 
nature. This makes such standards easier to codify by the standard’s organization and hence 
better to understand by the standard-adopting firm compared to generic standards. The higher 
level of specificity facilitates compliance likelihood. 
 
Proposition 3: Product-specific standards show higher compliance likelihood than do generic 
quality standards. 
 
 
Finally, this paper distinguishes three issue categories of sustainability, involving socio-
economic, environmental and food safety issues. Earlier research on ‘implementation 
likelihood’4 was found to be more advanced for environmental than for social issues (Kolk, 
2004). Quality standards specialists explain this finding as follows.5 Compared to socio-
economic standards, environmental and food standards can be codified at a more quantifiable 
level due to their technical nature. For these standards it is easier to set verifiable indicators, 
while the technical language enables engineers, both the standard developers as well as the 
standard adopters, to speak a common language. Furthermore, environmental standards have a 
longer history of development compared to socio-economic standards that emerged only 
during the last decade.  
 
Proposition 4: Quality standards that are primarily focused on environmental en food safety 
issues have higher compliance likelihood than have quality standards that focus on socio-
economic issues. 
 
 
4. Methodology 
 
Measurement instrument 
The measurement instrument (Table 1) is derived from the one that was introduced by Kolk, 
van Tulder, and Welters (1999) and Van Tulder and Kolk (2001) for the analysis of the 
compliance likelihood of company Codes of Conduct. Their instrument classifies company 
codes along the dimensions of specificity and compliance. The underlying assumption of the 
instrument is that the likelihood of the firm’s compliance to its own Code of Conduct is 
correlated with the specificity of the code’s issues, the measurability of the plans, and the 
transparency of the code’s monitoring system and compliance procedure. The instrument is 
also relevant for the analysis of quality standards, although the differences between company 
codes and industry quality standards require adjustments.  
 
The specificity part of the measurement instrument comprises of the standards’ scope, 
embeddedness and measurability. The sustainability scope is measured through 19 indicators 
of socio-economic, environmental, or food safety sustainability. Since standards may combine 
elements of these three sustainability categories, the instrument first measures how many of 
the 19 indicators are covered by the standard, resulting in a ‘scope score’. The scope also 
                                                 
4
 ‘Implementation likelihood’ is a variation of compliance likelihood that refers to the probability of 
implementation of codes of conducts within the company’s organization (Kolk, 2004). 
5
 The following argument is based on private communications with Hans Blonk (Blonk Milieu Advies, the 
Netherlands) and Jan Willem van der Schans (Agricultural Economics Research Institute, the Netherlands) on 26 
September 2007.  
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provides an indication of the main sustainability focus of the standard, i.e. the degree to which 
a standard concentrates on indicators of one sustainability category. Standards may only 
minimally mention specific sustainability issues because for these aspects they resort to third 
standards. For this reason the embeddedness of standards in third standards and the degree of 
such embeddedness are measured separately. The reference to third standards may only be 
general, i.e. without a clear indication of the way the standard relates to this third standard, or 
may include an explicit adoption of the third standard.6 It is assumed that a general reference 
to, or the adoption of third standards enhances compliance likelihood, because (a) the 
specificity of the standard increases and (b) an additional compliance mechanism (of the third 
standard) is involved. With measure the standards can be checked for measurable 
specifications. The better standards can be measured, the better the opportunities for 
monitoring, and the higher the likelihood of compliance (Kolk et al., 1999, pp. 153-4).  
 
The compliance part of the instrument is inspired by the ‘managerial approach’ rather than the 
‘enforcement approach’ to compliance, which embraces a tough coercive strategy of 
monitoring and sanctions (Tallberg, 2002). The managerial approach advances compliance 
through “jawboning”, i.e. pressure through strong persuasion, which involves problem-
solving based on capacity building, rule interpretation and transparency (Chayes and Chayes, 
1993). The instrument explicitly measures transparency and support, and values assistance as 
a sanction to non-compliance higher than immediate delisting. The transparency criterion 
measures the public availability and clarity of information on procedures and costs through 
the Internet and hence the accessibility of this information to potential new members and 
consumers. Support indicates the existence and intensity of (financial) support that is 
provided to the standard’s member firms. The monitoring of standards involves four aspects 
that together cover the observance and examination or auditing of compliance by standard 
members. The manner in which the standard manages non-compliance is measured through 
four distinct aspects related to sanctions.   
 
Except for scope, all criteria and indicators assess qualities of quality standards that are 
relevant to their compliance. The assumption underlying the instrument is that compliance is 
fostered by adoption of third standards, by measurable specification of targets, by procedural 
transparency, support of member firms, clear, frequent and low cost monitoring by 
independent organizations, and clear and reasonable sanction procedures. In other words: the 
higher the total score, the higher the likelihood of the compliance with the standard by 
member firms. 
 
                                                 
6
 Referencing to third standards may also have other reasons. The EurepGap (GlobalGap) website for instance 
refers to at least 12 third, national and international quality standards because they are accredited by EurepGap 
as standards that meet EurepGap criteria. Even tough such accreditation likely contributes to the international 
recognition of the EurepGap standard, these references enhance the compliance likelihood of the third standards, 
not of EurepGap itself. For this reason they were considered not to be relevant to this study     
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Table 1:  Measurement framework for the analysis of quality standards 
 
  Criteria Indicators 
 
Classification 
Socio- 
economic 
issues 
1.Employment 
2.Training 
3.Working Conditions 
4.Industrial relations 
 
5.Force 
6.Human rights 
7.Business interest 
8.Fair trade 
Employment promotion; equality of opportunity and treatment; job security  
Workers 
Wages and benefits; condition of work and life; safety and health 
Freedom of association; collective bargaining; consultation; examination of grievances; 
procedures for dispute settlement 
Reduction/elimination child labour; forced labour; disciplinary practices 
Universal declaration human rights, including the protection of cultural values 
Reducing trade barriers, promoting trade; promoting technology; innovation; efficiency 
Fair payment; bribery; pricing; market requirements; transparency, cooperation 
Ranging 
1-8 / 8 
Environme
ntal issues 
1.Water management 
2.Waste management 
3.Chemical use / storage  
   management 
4.Energy management 
5.Animal welfare 
6.Nature conservation 
Re-use of water, reduction of use 
Packaging materials; dumping; hazardous waste 
Controlled use of agro-chemicals 
 
Re-use of energy; green energy; reduction of usage 
Protection of animals, mistreatment, animal rights, painless production methods 
Land use and soil, natural production environment, biodiversity, no GMOs  
Ranging 
1-6 / 6 
Food 
Safety 
issues 
1.Hygiene 
 
2.Chemical residues 
3.Product manipulation 
4.Quality management 
5.Traceability 
Temperature; reducing bacteria; handling procedures (e.g. gloves), equipment and materials 
used 
Listed pesticides; reducing risk of residues; contamination; use of medication for animals 
Restrictions GMOs, nutritional value, additives 
Improving product, production, process 
Requirements for end products; display of labels, clearness, customer satisfaction  
 
Ranging 
1-5 / 5 
SC
O
PE
 
 Standard’s total scope score  Total / 19 
EM
BE
D
D
ED
 
N
ES
S Reference to third 
standards 
Standards may have enhanced their focus by embedding themselves for specific aspects in existing, 
international third standards Third standards may (1) be referred to in a general way (i.e. only 
mentioning the standard), or (2) be referred to through an explicit adoption of the entire standard 
 
1 = general reference; 2 = 
explicit adoption third 
standard 
SP
EC
IF
IC
IT
Y
 
 
M
EA
 
SU
R
E 
    Specifi- 
  cation of  
  issue focus 
To what extent does the standard provide measurable specifications? Such specifications may (0) not be 
available, (1) only be included in parts of the standard, (2) be included in most parts, or (3) be available 
for all parts of the standard. 
 
0 = NA; 1 = in parts; 2 = 
most of standard; 3 = 
entirely 
Transparenc
y of standard  
Is detailed information about the standard (requirements, costs, compliance procedure, support) available 
online and accessible for interested persons external to the value chain (consumers e.g.)? 
0 = no; 1 = in part; 2 = Yes 
TR
A
N
S 
PA
R
EN
C
Y
 
Cost 
transparency 
How transparent are the costs for certification? Transparency may range from (0) zero / no information, (1) 
vague, (2) clear to vague, to (3) clear. 
0 = NA; 1 = vague; 2 = 
vague to clear; 3 = clear 
Level Do standard organizations support value chain actors in the implementation of the standard? Standard 
organizations may (0) not, or only provide basic guidelines, (1) offer passive educational materials without 
additional support service, or (2) provide for active and specific support (training, expertise) 
 
0 = Basic; 1 = Education; 2 
= active Support 
SU
PP
O
R
T 
Financial 
support 
Who pays for the support? There are two options: (0) value chain actors have to pay for themselves, or the 
standards fail to provide online information on this issue, and (1) the standard organization or a third party 
is covering (a part of) the cost for support 
 
0 = chain actors or unclear 
1 = standard org or 3rd party 
Process of 
monitoring 
Is there a monitoring process specified? This process may be (0) unclear or not provided for, (1) only 
vaguely referred to, (2)  clear to vague with only clarity in some parts of the process, or (3) clearly 
described. 
0 = NA; 1 = vague ; 2 = 
vague to clear; 3 = clear  
Cost of 
certification 
Who assumes the costs for the monitoring process? This may be (0) entirely unclear, (1) the member firm 
itself, or (2) a third party. 
 
0 = unclear; 1 = firm; 2 = 
third party 
Position 
monitoring 
organization 
How independent is the monitoring organization? The organization might be (0) not existing or unclear, 
(1) a member firm, (2) a business sector group (BSG), or (3) a governmental authority, the standard’s 
organization, or an external organization  
0 = unclear; 1 = firm; 2 = 
BSG; 3 = governmental/ 
standards’/ external 
organization M
O
N
IT
O
R
IN
G
 
Frequency 
monitoring 
How often is compliance to the standard monitored? Monitoring may (0) be unclear, or take place (1) less 
than yearly, (2) yearly, or (3) more times per year 
0 = unclear; 1 = less 
once/year; 2 = yearly; 3 = 
more once/year  
Sanctioning 
process 
How detailed and complete is the description of the sanctioning process?  Standards may (0) fail to provide 
information on a sanctioning process, or offer (1) a general, vague reference only, (2) insight in some parts 
of the process, or (3) a detailed and a complete description   
 
0 = NA; 1 = general, vague;   
2 = partial; 3 = detailed and 
complete 
Compliance 
flexibility 
What happens if member firms fail to comply with the standard’s rules? Standard may (0) be silent on this 
situation, or respond by (1) immediate delisting, (2) a warning first, or (3) providing assistance to further 
compliance a.s.a.p. 
 
0 = NA; 1 = delisting; 2 = 
warning; 3 = assistance 
Publicity on 
sanctions 
Does the standard organizations publicize the failure to meet the standards? Standard may (0) fail to 
provide information on this issue, (1) publicize this internally (e.g. only on own website, or only by 
updating members list), or (2) externally (e.g. by press statement or  advertisements) 
 
0 = NA; 1 = Internally; 2 = 
Externally 
C
O
M
PL
IA
N
C
E 
SA
N
C
TI
O
N
S 
Fraud 
protection  
Does the standard have procedures in place to protect its members from misuse or fraud of the standard’s 
label? Standard may (0) fail to provide information on fraud protection procedures, (1) refer to these 
procedures in a general way, or (2) provide a detailed insight in their procedures.   
 
0 = NA; 1 = general; 2 = 
detailed 
NA= Not available 
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Sample of standards 
The study is based on a sample of 30 quality standards (Table 2). They include voluntarily 
adopted quality standards designed by either public or private entities, and they are selected 
because of their relevance to the food retail in Europe. The sample is relatively extensive as it 
is approaching the entire number of voluntary standards that European retailers apply to their 
suppliers located in developing countries.  
 
Data collection  
The data on individual standards are collected through the Internet only, by extensively 
searching the websites of the standards in the sample. Our data collection strategy was 
motivated by the assumption that analysis of qualities of quality standards could best take 
place by relying on key information that is publicly available online. At this stage of the study 
none of the 30 standard organizations was contacted for additional information, and no 
experts were consulted in respect of the objectives or procedures of specific standards.  
 
 
5. Main findings 
 
General results 
The results of the study are displayed in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 identifies the individual 
standards, their main characteristics, and their classification in terms of sustainability scope 
and compliance likelihood. Table 3 indicates the main findings per category of quality 
standards.  
 
The average scope of the 30 quality standards is 7.6, which represents around 40 per cent of 
the possible sustainability criteria (19) that are used in this study. This makes the standards, 
on average, relatively narrow in scope. Utz Certified has the broadest scope (15) and the 
European Fair Trade Association the lowest (2). The compliance likelihood average for all 
standards is low: the average score is 14.3, which amounts to 42 per cent of the maximum 
possible score of 34. The standard with highest compliance likelihood is EKO (28); the lowest 
score is for the Sustainable Consumption Roundtable standard (1).  
 
Differences by standard initiator  
With regard to scope we observe that standards initiated by individual NGOs are broadest in 
scope. They include almost twice as many environmental and socio-economic criteria (13) 
than do standards initiated by others. Standards initiated by (inter) governmental 
organizations define relatively more food safety items than the standards initiated by others. 
Product-specific standards address more environmental and socio-economic items than 
generic standards, while the score for food safety is almost even.  
 
Compliance likelihood is highest with standards initiated by individual NGOs (19.7), 
followed by standards initiated by business sector groups (BSGs) (15.8). Standards initiated 
by partnerships have the lowest compliance likelihood score (11.8), followed by standards 
initiated by (inter)governmental organizations (12.6). This result largely supports the first 
proposition that quality standards designed by individual NGOs show higher compliance 
likelihood than standards designed by individual firms and/or international governments.  The 
expectation as expressed in the second proposition was not yet supported by the existing 
findings: quality standards developed in present partnerships do not have higher but lower 
compliance likelihood than standards designed by individual NGOs. The compliance 
likelihood score  for partnership-initiated standards is generally lowest, with the exception of 
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the Common Code for the Coffee Community standard, which has a high compliance 
likelihood score (21), well beyond the average of NGO standards. The code knows already a 
relatively long gestation period (since 2002) and has strong commitment from the (German 
and Swiss) government, which makes the contributing stakeholders rather cohesive. The latter 
hints at initial support for the second part of proposition two in which the duration and the 
diversity of the partnership is considered important for its qualities. The number of 
observations for this study is too limited, however, to reach more solid conclusions.   
 
Differences by product group 
The scope of the 19 standards that were labelled as ‘product-specific’ is with a score of 8.1 
slightly broader than that of generic standards (6.7). This is somewhat surprising in that 
intuitively one would expect product-specific standards to be narrow in scope. The most 
obvious explanation is that a product focus enables standard initiators to define more explicit 
requirements. This argument is supported by the relatively high (2.26) score on measurability 
for product-specific standards, compared to a low score (1) for generic standards. 
  
In respect of compliance likelihood, product-specific standards do much better than generic 
standards. The respective scores are 16.7 and 10.1. This finding confirms proposition 3. 
Moreover, all eight standards that are classified as standards with high compliance likelihood 
are product specific. It is likely that these high scores correlate with standard initiators. All 
standards initiated by individual firms or NGOs are product specific, while BSG- and 
partnership-initiated standards are either generic or product-specific standards. The majority 
of the (inter)governmental standards can be categorized as generic.  
 
Sustainability focus 
The fourth proposition holds that those quality standards that are primarily focused on 
environmental en food safety issues have higher compliance likelihood than have quality 
standards focussing on socio-economic issues. It is not possible to test this proposition. The 
data on sustainability focus in Table 2 shows that the far majority of quality standards 
combine criteria for more than one sustainability category. Only seven standards focus on one 
category, while ten standards comprise of criteria from all three categories. The majority of 
standards show a stronger focus on socio-economic and/or environmental issues. Utz 
Certified is not only the broadest in scope, but also the most balanced: it scores a 5 for all 
three categories. The latter, however, implies also a somewhat lower score on socio-economic 
and environmental issues than the NGO codes.  
 
Standard scope 
With regard to the influence of the standard’s scope on compliance likelihood we had no prior 
proposition, apart from the intuitive idea that, combined with high compliance likelihood, a 
broader set of sustainability requirements leads to a higher sustainability effect. On the other 
hand, again intuitively, one would expect broader standards to have lower compliance 
likelihood because a wide range of objectives are likely more difficult to achieve than few 
objectives. From the sample, 14 standards can be categorized as having a narrow scope (2-
6.3), while the remaining 16 standards are equally divided over the categories medium scope 
(6.3-10.7) and broad scope (10.7-15). Table 3 shows that the standards with a broad scope 
have higher compliance likelihood than standards with a narrow or medium scope. However, 
Table 2 indicates that all standards with high compliance likelihood are either narrow or broad 
in scope. This ambiguous finding could indicate that a third, yet unknown variable influences 
the effect of the standard scope on the compliance likelihood.  
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Table 2 Classification of individual standards by initiator, product focus, sustainability focus, scope and compliance likelihood 
Standard name Initiator Product focus Socio-economic(8) Environmental (6) Safety (5) Scope  Compliance likelihood  
Nature and More Individual firm Product specific 5 2 3 Medium Low 
Sara Lee’s Supplier Selection Guidelines Individual firm Product specific 5 2 0 Medium Low 
Starbucks Green Coffee Purchasing Guidelines Individual firm Product specific 3 5 0 Medium Medium 
Marine Stewardship Council Individual firm Product specific 0 2 0 Narrow High 
Utz Certified  Individual firm Product specific 5 5 5 Broad High 
European Fair Trade Association BSG Generic 2 0 0 Narrow Low 
Ethical Tea Partnership BSG Product specific 5 0 0 Narrow Medium 
Global Food Safety Initiative BSG Product specific 0 0 3 Narrow Medium 
EUREPGAP Code (1) BSG Product specific 0 3 2 Narrow High 
British Retail Consortium code BSG Generic 6 3 3 Broad Medium 
QS  BSG Product specific 0 4 2 Narrow High 
Sustainable Agriculture Initiative Platform BSG Generic 4 5 2 Broad Low 
MPS-A,B,C & SQ (2) BSG Product specific 5 4 0 Medium High 
Good Manufacturing Practices (inter)governmental Generic 0 0 3 Narrow Medium 
EKO (inter)governmental Product specific 0 0 2 Narrow High 
FAO Code for responsible fisheries (inter)governmental Product specific 3 3 0 Medium Low 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (inter)governmental Generic 7 2 0 Medium Medium 
Global Compact (inter)governmental Generic 7 4 0 Broad Medium 
ISO 22000 (inter)governmental Generic 0 0 3 Narrow Medium 
ILO Convention 184 (inter)governmental Generic 3 3 0 Narrow Medium 
FAO Code of Conduct on Pesticides (inter)governmental Generic 0 4 3 Medium Low 
Codex Alimentarius (inter)governmental Product specific 0 0 5 Narrow Low 
Rain Forest Alliance/SAN Individual NGO Product specific 6 5 0 Broad Medium 
Max Havelaar Individual NGO Product specific 7 6 0 Broad High 
Fairtrade Labelling Organisation Individual NGO Product specific 7 6 0 Broad High 
Sustainable Consumption Roundtable Partnership Generic 0 2 0 Narrow Low 
Ethical Trading Initiative Base Code Partnership Generic 5 0 0 Narrow Medium 
Fair Flowers & Plants Partnership  Product specific 0 4 0 Narrow Medium 
Common Codes for the Coffee Community Partnership Product specific 7 5 0 Broad High 
Forest Stewardship Council  Partnership Product specific 6 4 0 Medium Medium 
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Table 3 Sustainability and compliance likelihood of 30 voluntary quality  
   standards for the European retail 
 
 Sustainability scope 
(Maximum score 19) 
Compliance likelihood 
(Maximum score 34) 
Overall mean 7,6 14,3 (42%) 
By initiator   
Firm (N=5) 8, 14,4 (42%) 
BSG (N=8) 6,8 15,8 (46%) 
Government (N=9) 6,3 12,6 (37%) 
NGO (N=3) 13,0 19,7 (58%) 
Partnership (N=5) 7,0 11,8 (35%) 
By product focus   
Product specific (N=19) 8,1 16,7 (49%) 
Generic (N=11) 6,7 10,1 (30%) 
By scope    
Narrow (N=14)  14,9 (44%) 
Medium N=8)  10,1 (30%) 
Broad (=8)  17,5 (51%) 
 
 
 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
 
The aim of this study was to determine the effectiveness of voluntary quality standards 
in contributing to the sustainability of global agri-food supply chains. We first 
developed a measurement instrument to assess the ‘qualities’ of quality standards 
required by the European retail sector in respect of their food suppliers from developing 
countries. Based on specificity and compliance indicators we could analyze and 
compare the standards on their sustainability scope and compliance likelihood. The 
results indicate some relationships between standard initiator, scope, product focus on 
the one hand, and sustainability scope and compliance likelihood on the other.  
 
Average compliance likelihood for the entire sample of standards is - with a score of 42 
per cent - quite low. So, the effectiveness of good intentions laid down in voluntary 
quality standards may be far lower than is often expected. But there is substantial 
variation among standards. Around 30 per cent of the standards in the sample show 
relatively high compliance likelihood. They include: Max Havelaar, Fairtrade Labelling 
Organisation, Utz Certified, Common Codes for the Coffee Community, EUREPGAP, 
QS, EKO, Marine Stewardship Council, and MPS A,B,C, & SQ7. These nine are the 
only standards in the sample that have a compliance likelihood score higher than 60 per 
cent. On average, their score is 70 per cent, with EKO on top (82 per cent). 
 
                                                 
7
 In this study MPS ABC and MPS SQ are considered to represent a single standard because publicly 
accessible sources create the impression that the requirements are part of one and the same standard. 
Since MPS ABC and MPS SQ have a distinct focus on respectively environmental and socio-economic 
issues, our decision may cause bias in the analysis.     
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Standards initiated by NGOs show highest compliance likelihood, followed by BSG-
initiated standards. This positive result for NGO standards may be partially biased due 
to the small number of NGO standards in the sample (3), for which further research is 
recommended. BSG-initiated standards result in higher compliance likelihood than 
those initiated by individual firms or multi-stakeholder partnerships. This result may be 
explained by the fact that both the firms and partnerships represent two extreme sides 
of cooperation, but also by the relatively recent nature of many of the partnership 
initiatives. Individual firms might lack a clear view of sustainability and compliance 
requirements which a standard must include to improve its compliance likelihood. It is 
also possible that firms communicate their standard’s requirements through non-public 
communication channels to their suppliers. Another explanation is that, despite the 
intentions that are communicated, standards designed by individual firms serve other 
means than improving the sustainability of the supply chain. 
 
The reason that partnership standards result in low compliance likelihood may be that 
multi-stakeholder agreements can only be reached through consensus and compromise. 
This may diminish the vigour of the standard, an outcome that is reflected in a lack of 
detailed requirements on sustainability specificity and compliance. Partnerships with 
stakeholders outside of the direct value chain are generally considered to be a 
prerequisite for a more pro-active CSR strategy which potentially could render a much 
higher compliance likelihood, and thus sustainability, than existing (individual) 
initiative.  From the results so far we can conclude that there is still a ‘world to be 
gained’ in the effective management of partnerships. However, the Common Codes for 
the Coffee community shows an interesting leading example which has already resulted 
in considerably higher quality levels than any of the other standards.  
 
The interesting question now is whether the study allows us to make judgements on 
whether some standards are better than others. We think it is possible. When “better” is 
defined in terms of two qualities, a ‘broad’ sustainability scope (score >10.7) combined 
with relatively ‘high’ compliance likelihood (score >19), there are four standards that 
fit this definition: Max Havelaar, Fairtrade Labelling Organisation, Utz Certified, 
Common Codes for the Coffee Community. These are the better voluntary quality 
standards of the European retail; they have the most wide sustainability scope and the 
highest likelihood that they do what they say they do. So, the managerial conclusion of 
the above still is that either NGO-initiated standards or well managed partnership 
standards might provide the best guarantee for better and more sustainable standards 
that do not serve specific interests in improving the bargaining position in the value 
chain, but might lead to increased sustainability of the whole (global) value chain. 
 
All these conclusions must be related to the limitations of this study, however. All data 
used were derived from publicly available, online sources, and the study focused on 
intentions and the probability of compliance, rather than the actual effectiveness of 
standards. To further validate the findings of this study, further research is therefore 
required that includes primary information sources other than those available online, 
expert opinions, and interviews with the actors in the global retail value chains actors.  
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Finally, our sustainability focus was based on the standards’ requirements related to the 
three P’s. We observed that the standards barely refer to requirements that facilitate the 
firm applying to develop profit generating activities in order to cover the additional 
costs of sustainability while at the same time remaining competitive. These profit 
generating activities could include the creation of value, competition reduction, and 
pricing. Literature on the impact of quality standards on suppliers’ upgrading 
opportunities is extremely scarce (cf. Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004), and the area is 
largely under-researched. We realize that also this study on sustainability scope and 
compliance likelihood did not yet address these important issues. Further research 
should therefore aim at the relation between the qualities of quality standards and their 
effects on adding value within the GVC connecting food suppliers from developing 
countries to the European (food) retail sector.  
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